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SNITCHES CAUSE STITCHES: THE NEED FOR
LEGISLATIVE REFORM ON JAILHOUSE INFORMANT
TESTIMONY LAWS
Jennifer Sutterer*
INTRODUCTION
Four years after the body of a young girl was discovered in a garbage bag in
Philadelphia, police coerced a mentally-disabled man named Walter Ogrod into confessing to the murder.1 Even though Ogrod did not match the physical description of
the suspect and his signed “confession” was in the handwriting of a detective on the
case, the judge admitted it into evidence at his 1993 trial.2 The twelve jurors voted
to acquit but after the verdict was announced, one juror raised doubts and a mistrial
was granted.3 Prior to Ogrod’s retrial, prosecutors disclosed that two inmates, John
Hall and Jay Wolchansky, were prepared to testify that Ogrod discussed his role in
the murder with them in prison.4 Wolchansky was brought forward at trial and stated
that while in prison, Ogrod confessed to killing the victim with a weight bar after the
victim refused to engage in oral sex.5 Without any additional evidence, the jury voted
to convict Ogrod and sentenced him to death.6
By 2011, Ogrod obtained new evidence proving his innocence.7 Before his
death, John Hall signed an affidavit admitting that he fed information to Wolchansky,
who never heard a confession from Ogrod.8 An affidavit from Hall’s widow confirmed this information and admitted that she sent newspaper clippings about the
young girl’s murder to Hall in prison to assist him in fabricating a confession from

* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2023; B.A. in Political Science, University of
Missouri, 2020; B.A. in Philosophy, University of Missouri, 2020. I would like to thank Professor Jimmy
Gurulé and Kevin Murphy for their patience, advice, and guidance on the content of this note and the notewriting process. I would also like to thank Elliot Slosar, Nikolai Stieglitz, Patti Fayed, Anne Peterson, and
everyone else at the Notre Dame Exoneration Justice Clinic for inspiring this Note, but more importantly, for
their work in freeing wrongfully convicted individuals. All remaining mistakes are my own.
1. Walter Ogrod Exonerated After 23 Years on Pennsylvania’s Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.
(June 9, 2020), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/walter-ogrod-freed-after-23-years-on-pennsylvania-death-ro
w. In this instance, the Philadelphia police interrogated Ogrod for fourteen hours straight. Id.
2. Rob Warden & John Seasly, Walter Ogrod: Mentally-Disabled Man Gives Confession to Detectives
with Tainted Record, Innocence Watch (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.injusticewatch.org/projects/unrequited-inn
ocence/2019/walter-ogrod-mentally-disabled-man-gives-confession-to-detectives-with-tainted-record/.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Ogrod.9 Further, she stated that her husband was handed information in multiple
cases by detectives and the district attorney in order to fabricate confessions and testify to them.10 As Hall’s widow said, “[h]e would get some of the truth and he would
sit in his cell and make up stories–-and he was darned good at it.”11 After twentythree years spent on death row because of Hall’s actions and Wolchansky’s testimony, Ogrod was finally exonerated on June 5, 2020.12
Known infamously as “The Monsignor” for his apparent ability to obtain confessions from other inmates, John Hall obtained name recognition in the Philadelphia
criminal legal system for his role as a jailhouse informant in high-stakes cases.13
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Hall was a regular informant and witness in homicide cases.14 When the body of a twenty-one year old girl was found under a bridge,
Hall claimed that the victim’s boyfriend privately told him that he molested the victim on the bridge and then “karate chopped” her off, leading to the conviction of the
boyfriend.15 Additionally, in 1987, Hall’s claims that numerous inmates were planning a prison escape also resulted in convictions across the board.16 In exchange for
his information, Hall was given leniency by the state on his own sentences17 for theft,
portraying himself as a doctor, and child neglect.18 However, it was not long before
Hall’s unreliability became too egregious to ignore. For example, in one homicide
case, Hall told state officials that two inmates confessed to him and “then tried to
bolster his story by planting a necklace in a defendant’s prison cell.”19 Instead of
refusing to use him as an informant, however, officers simply did not call Hall to
testify at trial and allowed Hall to pass information to other inmates, who would testify to hearing the confessions firsthand.20
The cases of Walter Ogrod, or John Hall for that matter, are not unique. Since
1974, at least 212 individuals have been wrongfully convicted in part due to jailhouse
informant testimony, one of the principal causes of wrongful convictions in the

9. Will Bunch, Walter Ogrod’s 22-Year Fight to Escape Death Row Gains Hope from Krasner, Documentary, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/columnists/will_bunch/walter-ogro
d-death-row-stories-hln-larry-krasner-dna-testing-philadelphia-20180405.html.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 1.
13. Bunch, supra note 10.
14. Matt Coughlin, Convicted Murderer Fights to Clear Name in Girlfriend’s Death, NBC 10 PHILA. (May
31, 2013, 11:24 AM), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/convicted-murderer-fighting-to-clear-nam
e/1983260/.
15. Id.
16. Gay Elwell, Informant Had Lots of Practice Snitch in Ernest Murder Case Warned of Planned
Northhampton Prison Break, MORNING CALL (Dec. 2, 1995, 12:00 AM), https://www.mcall.com/news/mc-xpm
-1995-12-02-3060649-story.html.
17. Warden & Seasly, supra note 3.
18. Elwell, supra note 17. There, Hall was charged with child neglect after his twelve-year-old stepdaughter was left home alone for three months. Id.
19. Coughlin, supra note 15.
20. See Warden & Seasly, supra note 3.
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United States.21 In combination, this has resulted in the loss of 3,248 years of freedom for innocent citizens.22 These wrongful convictions are not confined geographically, either, as they have occurred in at least forty states.23
The National Registry of Exonerations defines a jailhouse informant, also referred to as a “snitch,”24 as “a witness who was in custody with the exonerated defendant and who testified that the defendant confessed to him.”25 Jailhouse informants are distinct from other government informants because they are already
incarcerated for a separate crime and live in near proximity to defendants with pending charges. Because they know that prosecutors can and routinely do provide jailhouse informants with assistance in reducing their time in prison, in exchange for
providing incriminating information, jailhouse informants have a strong incentive to
provide prosecutors with such information without regard for its truth.26 This incentive, combined with the inability in most cases to corroborate statements made between inmates in a prison cell, makes for “a particularly risky and unreliable category
of criminal informant.”27
The primary issue with jailhouse snitches is that their testimony is inherently
unreliable because many snitches are given significant benefits in exchange for
providing statements or testimony against a defendant, usually in the form of sentence
modifications, dismissals, or favorable pleas by the prosecution.28 Clarence Zacke,
for example, was a jailhouse informant sentenced to 180 years for murder and conspiracy to commit murder.29 In exchange for testifying that a defendant confessed to
raping a victim in another case, Zacke received a reduction on his own sentence to
“sixty years or less with good behavior.”30 While sentence modifications offered in
exchange for testimony should be encompassed under “The Brady Rule,”31 which
requires prosecutors to disclose “materially exculpatory evidence” to the defense,32
the numerous cases of exonerees reveal a disturbing pattern of prosecutors making
prison-time-for-testimony deals in secret and not disclosing them at trial.33 This, in

21. Detailed View, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Pages/detaillist.aspx?View={FAF6EDDB-5A68-4F8F-8A52-2C61F5BF9EA7}&FilterField1=Group&Filter
Value1=JI (last visited May 22, 2022) [hereinafter “National Registry Detailed View”].
22. See id.
23. See id. According to the National Registry of Exonerations, only Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, South Dakota, Utah, and Vermont have not yet reported
any exonerations stemming originally from jailhouse informant testimony. Id.
24. For the purposes of this Note, the terms “informant” and “snitch” will be used interchangeably.
25. Samuel Gross & Kaitlin Jackson, Snitch Watch, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (May 13, 2015),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Features.Snitch.Watch.aspx.
26. Alexandra Natapoff, The Shadowy World of Jailhouse Informants: Explained, APPEAL (July 16, 2018),
https://theappeal.org/the-lab/explainers/the-shadowy-world-of-jailhouse-informants-explained/.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. JUST. PROJECT, JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY: A POLICY REVIEW, 11–12 (2007).
30. Id. Ultimately, the defendant was exonerated in 2004, and Zacke was given five additional life sentences after it was discovered that he was raping his adopted daughter. Id.
31. Brady Rule, LEGAL INFO. INST. (Oct. 2017), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/brady_rule.
32. Id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
33. See Gross & Jackson, supra note 26. For example, in the case of Cameron Todd Willingham, faulty
forensic science and jailhouse informant testimony led to the wrongful conviction and eventually the wrongful
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turn, prevents defense counsel from presenting evidence of the deals during cross
examination and impeaching the trustworthiness of the informants or, at the very
least, posing a question on their credibility to the jury.34 Without a concrete reason
to doubt the reliability of the informant’s testimony, the jury is at risk of taking the
informant at their word and believing that the defendant confessed to the crime in the
privacy of a prison cell, thus giving the jury a reason to convict.35
Even with these dangers, the vast majority of states have no mechanisms for ensuring the reliability of jailhouse informant testimony prior to them taking the stand.36
Rather, only a handful of states have passed any type of regulation on the use of
jailhouse informants.37 These legislative reforms range from specifying what information prosecutors must turn over on the informants to the defense, to requiring jury
instructions on the reliability of jailhouse informant testimony, to holding a pretrial
hearing on the reliability of the informant’s testimony.38 Notably, several states require the jailhouse informant’s testimony to be independently corroborated prior to
its admission at trial.39 While some states such as Connecticut have comprehensively
enacted all of these reforms into their code,40 others like Utah have only passed one
piece.41 Although the number of states that have passed legislative reforms is small,
they have been enacted within the past fifteen years,42 which shows a national trend
progressing towards reforming jailhouse informant laws. This trend is further supported by the fact that at least one additional state has recently proposed similar legislation, although the bill has not yet officially been passed into law.43
Given the loss of life and limb resulting from current regulations, there is a crucial need for legislation restricting the admissibility of jailhouse informant testimony
in criminal trials. Further, it is imperative that legislative reforms encompass at least
two key provisions: (i) pretrial hearings in which the state bears the burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that the informant’s testimony is both reliable and
independently corroborated, and (ii) required disclosures concerning the informant
and deals given now or in the future, based off of a statewide record system, with a
mechanism for enforcement. This Note seeks to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of various existing state regulations on the admissibility of jailhouse informant

execution of an innocent man in 2004. Id. In recent years, the jailhouse informant spoke out and admitted “that
his testimony was false and was procured by a secret deal with the prosecutor.” Id.
34. Innocence Project Staff, Informing Injustice: The Disturbing Use of Jailhouse Informants, INNOCENCE
PROJECT (Mar. 6, 2019), https://innocenceproject.org/informing-injustice/.
35. Russell D. Covey, Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1375, 1390
(2014).
36. Ariel Rothfield, Kansas Bill Regulating Jailhouse Witness Testimony Unlikely to Become Law This
Year, KSHB (Apr. 16, 2021, 8:41 PM), https://www.kshb.com/news/crime/kansas-bill-regulating-jailhouse-wit
ness-testimony-unlikely-to-become-law-this-year.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 111.5 (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-131 (2019).
40. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-131 (2019).
41. SUP. CT. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS–CRIM., JAILHOUSE
INFORMANT (Aug. 7, 2013).
42. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 35.
43. Rothfield, supra note 37.
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testimony, including Illinois Law 100-111944 and Connecticut Public Act No. 19131,45 and to advocate for the adoption of strict jailhouse informant bills across the
nation, in order to prevent further wrongful convictions.
Section I of this Note describes the problem and dimensions of wrongful convictions in the United States and abroad. Section II discusses the specific contribution
jailhouse informants make to this broader issue and lays out studies of some of the
most egregious cases involving jailhouse informants. Section III proposes a solution
to the danger of jailhouse informant testimony by advocating for legislative reform.
This Section presents a comprehensive description and comparison of current state
laws and directives, as well as a recent proposal that is pending in committee. Additionally, it analyzes the various state enactments and evaluates the essential provisions that should be included in nationwide legislative reform. Section IV addresses
counterarguments often raised in response to proposed jailhouse informant legislation and explains why those counterarguments are unpersuasive. Section V provides
a brief conclusion.
I.

THE SCOPE OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

The wrongful conviction of innocent persons has been a problem for decades,
although the depth of this problem has only recently come to light, likely in part to
increased reforms and technological advances. Between 1989 and 2017, over 2,100
individuals were exonerated in the United States after being wrongfully convicted.46
This breaks down to “6 exonerations per month for 29 years ([or] 1 every 5 days).”47
More recently, in 2019 alone, 155 innocent United States citizens were exonerated.48
One year later, in 2020, 143 wrongful convictions were overturned.49 In 2021, 142
individuals were exonerated.50 Taken in combination, these individuals lost thousands of years of their lives in prison for crimes they did not commit.51
Not only are these numbers staggering, but they also reflect deep racial disparities in the United States criminal justice system. Of the 2,100 individuals exonerated
between 1989 and 2017, “[f]orty-seven percent of these victims of wrongful conviction were African American, even though African Americans make up only 13 percent of the U.S. population.”52 Further, African-Americans staggeringly comprised

44. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-21 (2019).
45. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-131 (2019).
46. DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE CULTURE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN JAPAN 64 (Bill Hebenton et al. eds.,
2020).
47. Id.
48. Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.um
ich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx (last visited May 22, 2022).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Andriana Moskovska, 33 Startling Wrongful Conviction Statistics [2021 Update], HIGH CT. (Oct. 13,
2021), https://thehighcourt.co/wrongful-convictions-statistics/. In 2019, the exonerees together spent 1,908
years in prison. Id. See also 2021 Annual Report, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Mar. 30, 2021), https://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/2021AnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter 2021 Exoneration
Report]. In 2020, the exonerees spent 1,737 years in prison. Id.
52. JOHNSON, supra note 47, at 64.
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sixty-seven percent of DNA exonerations between those years.53 The Innocence Project details even more recent data, noting that there have been at least 375 DNA exonerations in the United States since 1989.54 Of these exonerations, more than sixtynine percent were African-American, Latinx, Asian American, Native American, or
self-identified as “Other.”55 In contrast, the Caucasian demographic made up only
thirty-one percent of DNA exonerations,56 despite Caucasians making up seventy six
point three percent of the United States population as of 2019.57
While DNA exonerations have allowed the scope of wrongful convictions to be
largely revealed, modern scientific advances have not eradicated past wrongful convictions or the present risk, nor fixed the issues of racial inequality in the United
States criminal justice system.58 In addition, even though DNA and forensic technologies have advanced, they may later prove to be faulty or overly subjective, and
the cause of numerous wrongful convictions in the United States. 59 Since 1989, one
in four exonerees was wrongfully convicted based on faulty forensic evidence, including bite mark analysis, which was considered a legitimate and trustworthy science until recent years.60
Moreover, the problem of wrongful convictions is not simply a domestic problem. For example, courts in China “overturned” 1,821 convictions in 2018 and 1,774
convictions in 2019.61 In western Germany, between the years 1951 and 1964, there
were 1,415 wrongful convictions.62 In Japan, there were 162 wrongful convictions
between 1910 and 2010.63 While this number may seem comparatively low, Japan
also boasts, troublingly, “conviction rates higher than ninety-nine percent,” that are
obtained primarily through “confessions rather than thorough investigations.”64 Russia, too, claims a ninety-nine percent conviction rate, which raises obvious questions
about the accuracy of these verdicts.65 A Moscow Professor of Law explained this
rate, saying that “[u]nfortunately a judge in Russia can lose his job for too many
acquittals. If there are too many acquittals––not incorrect acquittals, mind you––a

53. Matthew Clarke, Racism and Wrongful Convictions, CRIM. LEGAL NEWS (May 15, 2020).
54. DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/dna-exoner
ations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited May 22, 2022).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. QUICK FACTS: UNITED STATES, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact
/table/US/PST045221.
58. See DNA Exonerations in the United States, supra note 55.
59. Daniele Selby, Why Bite Mark Evidence Should Never Be Used in Criminal Trials, INNOCENCE
PROJECT (Apr. 26, 2020), https://innocenceproject.org/what-is-bite-mark-evidence-forensic-science/.
60. Id. In 2009, The National Academy of Science released a report that stated that the forensic field of
bite mark analysis was subject to “substantial rates of erroneous results.” Id.
61. Paul Mozur, He Spent 26 Years in a Chinese Prison. Then He Was Cleared of Murder., N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/06/world/asia/china-inmate-murder-zhang-yuhuan.html.
62. JOHNSON, supra note 47, at 66.
63. Id. at 67.
64. Carl Schreck, Russia’s 99% Conviction Rate Thrown Into Question, NAT’L (Feb. 18, 2010), https://ww
w.thenationalnews.com/world/europe/russia-s-99-conviction-rate-thrown-into-question-1.563824.
65. Id.
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suspicion arises that the judge may be corrupt, and reasons will be found to fire him.
This creates fear among judges.”66
Wrongful convictions are pervasive even in cases involving the ultimate stakes
of life and death. In 2016, at least sixty individuals across the globe were exonerated
after being wrongfully convicted and sentenced to death.67 Between 1973 and 2017,
161 individuals in the United States were exonerated after being given a death sentence.68 Although many modernized countries, like Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom, and France have abolished capital punishment,69 the United States and other
countries who have maintained their death penalty laws can apply it as punishment
to severe crimes, for which wrongful convictions are prevalent.70
These statistics, while shocking, only account for those cases of innocence that
have been proven. Many others who are innocent of the crimes for which they were
convicted are still sitting in prison and will never leave. The National Registry of
Exonerations 2019 report shares a shocking estimate: “[b]etween 2% and 10% of
convicted individuals in US prisons are innocent.”71 Given that over two million
individuals are incarcerated in the United States,72 this estimates that approximately
200,000 incarcerated individuals are actually innocent. While those who face decades in prison may have their lifetime to fight to prove their innocence, those condemned to death do not.
II. THE ROLE OF JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS
Jailhouse informants are a primary cause and contributor to the problem of
wrongful convictions.73 In the United States alone, the use of jailhouse snitch testimony has led to the incarceration of at least 212 innocent individuals.74 Of the DNA
exonerations reported by the Innocence Project, seventeen percent of the cases used
the testimony of jailhouse snitches.75 The use of jailhouse informants has historically
been higher in more serious crimes, especially murder.76 In addition, of the 123
66. Id.
67. CORNELL CTR. ON THE DEATH PENALTY WORLDWIDE, JUSTICE DENIED: A GLOBAL STUDY OF
WRONGFUL DEATH ROW CONVICTIONS, 6 (Jan. 2018), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/innoce
nceclinicreport2018R4final.pdf.
68. Id.
69. Countries That Have Abolished the Death Penalty Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://dea
thpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/international/countries-that-have-abolished-the-death-penalty-since-1976 (last
visited May 22, 2022).
70. 2021 Exoneration Report, supra note 49. In 2020, there were 129 exonerations. Id. Of these, ninetythree were of “violent felonies, including 64 homicides, nine child sex abuse convictions, and four sexual assaults on adults. Six of the homicide exonerees had been sentenced to death.” Id.
71. Moskovska, supra note 52 (citing NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT (Mar.
31, 2020)).
72. Incarcerated Rates in Selected Countries 2021, STATISTA (June 2, 2021), https://www.statista.com/stat
istics/262962/countries-with-the-most-prisoners-per-100-000-inhabitants/. The United States is “home to the
largest number of prisoners” in the world. Id. When comparing the number of incarcerated individuals to the
national U.S. population, this breaks down to “639 prisoners per 100,000 of the national population.” Id.
73. INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 35.
74. See National Registry Detailed View, supra note 22.
75. INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 35.
76. Gross & Jackson, supra note 26.
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exonerees who were sentenced to death, twenty-one percent of their cases included
jailhouse informant testimony.77
The motivation of jailhouse informants contributing to this problem is best explained through the lens of self-interest. First, inmates facing decades in prison have
incentives to lie about having important information, such as a confession, from a
defendant in order to secure a sentence reduction or modification on their own
charges from the courts.78 As one author explained, “[t]he state is allowed to offer
extraordinary benefits to people behind bars if they offer testimony that is favorable
to the state’s case. These rewards may include reduced sentences, the dismissal of
charges and even cash payments.”79 Second, police and prosecutors have the incentive to persuade jailhouse informants to lie about overhearing a confession from the
defendant, or at least to suborn their testimony without regard for its accuracy, in
order to obtain a conviction.80 In the most extreme cases, members of law and enforcement and prosecutors have been caught feeding information to snitches, such as
giving them police reports, case records, photographs, and “even escorting them to
crime scenes so they could better shape their testimony to fit the evidence.”81 Moreover, prosecutors have the incentive not to disclose critical evidence about the informant to the defense, which could lead to a successful cross examination and subsequent acquittal.82 Prosecutors may be incentivized to engage in this behavior in
order to campaign on high conviction rates while running for public office and to
appease the public in charge of their re-elections.83 This is not a broad theory based
on the prisoner’s dilemma; instead, it is a proven statement that “[i]n many wrongful
convictions, defendants were not given key information related to the credibility of
the jailhouse informants who testified against them, including the benefits they received, previous cases in which they acted as jailhouse informants, and their criminal
history.”84 Lacking this impeachment evidence, the only avenue to refute the informant’s testimony is by waiving the defendant’s right not to testify and taking the stand,
given that the alleged confession occurred during a private conversation.85
Regardless of their obvious conflicts of interest, jailhouse informants are extremely effective in persuading jurors to convict.86 A 2007 study revealed that jurors
77. INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 35.
78. Gross & Jackson, supra note 26.
79. Pamela Colloff & Katie Zavadski, Convicted Based On Lies, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 9, 2020), https://featur
es.propublica.org/jailhouse-informant-exonerees/jailhouse-informant-false-testimony-exoneree-portraits/.
80. Covey, supra note 36, at 1384–85.
81. Pamela Colloff, He’s a Liar, a Con Artist and a Snitch. His Testimony Could Soon Send a Man to His
Death, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 4, 2019, 5 a.m.), https://www.propublica.org/article/hes-a-liar-a-con-artist-and-a-sni
tch-his-testimony-could-soon-send-a-man-to-his-death.
82. Id.
83. Andrew Novak, It’s Too Dangerous to Elect Prosecutors, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 14, 2017, 9:50 a.m.), ht
tps://www.thedailybeast.com/its-too-dangerous-to-elect-prosecutors.
84. INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 35.
85. See Covey, supra note 36, at 1400–03. This, of course, presents further problems for the defense in
opening the defendant up for cross examination. Id. Moreover, the defendant’s denial of the snitch’s testimony
is unlikely to even be effective with the jury, as “many criminal defendants––especially defendants with a criminal history––go into a jury trial with their own credibility highly suspect and will often be unlikely to come out
on top in any swearing contest.” Id. at 1401–02.
86. Id.
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faced with a very weak and circumstantial case against a defendant would typically
acquit (only twenty-six percent voted to convict), but jurors given the identical case
with a jailhouse informant overwhelmingly found the defendant guilty (between
sixty-six and seventy-six percent voted to convict).87 When sampled, the jurors in
favor of conviction stated that they were most heavily influenced by the jailhouse
informant’s testimony.88 Further, the study found that jurors would convict a defendant at equal rates based on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of a jailhouse
informant, even though one group was also told that the informant received a direct
benefit in exchange for testifying.89
One egregious use of jailhouse informants occurred in the case of Nicholas Yarris in Pennsylvania, who was wrongfully convicted and sentenced to death after jailhouse informant testimony was admitted in his criminal trial.90 There, the body of a
woman who had been stabbed and raped was found in the snow.91 After a heated
encounter with police at a traffic stop, Yarris was brought into the station and became
a suspect.92 Serological testing did not implicate or exclude Yarris, which was presented at his 1982 trial alongside circumstantial evidence, such as the fact that the
victim had physical similarities to Yarris’ ex-girlfriend.93 However, the State relied
heavily on the testimony of a jailhouse informant who testified that Yarris confessed
to committing the crime to him while in a nearby cell.94 This was sufficient for the
jury, who convicted Yarris and sentenced him to death.95 He remained on death row
for over twenty-one years until 2003, when new DNA testing excluded him from the
crime; then, Yarris was officially exonerated.96
In another case, a man named Harold Hall was convicted in California in 1990
for murder.97 This conviction was based exclusively on jailhouse informant testimony and a false confession, given after a grueling seventeen hour interrogation without an attorney present or breaks.98 One jailhouse snitch, who was promised a reduction on his own murder charge, passed handwritten notes to Hall’s cell, asking
innocent questions.99 Once Hall passed the notes back with his answers, the snitch
would erase the original, innocent questions and inscribe questions about the murder

87. Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., The Effects of Accomplice Witnesses and Jailhouse Informants on Jury
Decision Making, AM. PSYCH.-LAW SOC’Y (2007), https://scholarworks.utep.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1031&context=christian_meissner/.
88. Id. at 11.
89. Id. at 6.
90. Simon Cole et al., NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.law.umich.edu/sp
ecial/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3771.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Yarris v. Cnty of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 132–33 (3d Cir. 2006).
96. Cole et al., supra note 91.
97. Stephanie Denzel, Harold Hall, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3270.
98. Id.
99. Colloff & Zavadski, supra note 80.
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in their place.100 These handwritten notes were presented at Hall’s trial as proof of
Hall’s confession.101 An additional jailhouse snitch testified against Hall in exchange
for only “$25 and a pack of cigarettes.”102 In 1995, Hall was granted a new trial due
to expert testimony that there was evidence “that the notes had been partly erased,”
and in 2004, Hall was fully exonerated.103
In addition, prosecutors do not always use a jailhouse informants for just one
case. Instead, if they find a willing snitch who is successful on the stand, they may
use them as an informant in multiple cases.104 Being a “career” or “serial snitch” can
also be a tempting role for individuals facing decades of incarceration.105 Referred
to as “one of the most prolific jailhouse informants in U.S. history,”106 Paul Skalnik’s
testimony as a career jailhouse snitch resulted in dozens of prison sentences and four
death sentences in Florida.107 Skalnik began his newfound career in prison in 1983
and after successfully snitching in two cases that resulted in the death penalty, was
given the protection of a single cell secure from other inmates.108 From this cell,
Skalnik testified that he heard the confession of James Dailey, who had been charged
after a fourteen-year-old girl had been stabbed thirty-one times and left naked in a
river to drown.109 It was a case without DNA, forensic evidence, or a murder
weapon.110 Another man, Jack Pearcy, admitted to driving the victim to her last location and stabbing her once, but originally put the rest of the blame on Dailey in
exchange for a life sentence.111
Wanting a conviction and death sentence, detectives began questioning Dailey’s
neighboring inmates and even provided them with newspaper clippings that detailed
the crime, but they all denied Dailey giving a confession until Skalnik came forward.112 Even though Pearcy refused to testify, Skalnik’s story at trial was enough
for the jury, who sentenced Dailey to death.113 Prior to testifying, Skalnik had been
charged with grand theft—a charge worth twenty years—but five days after Dailey’s
conviction, Skalnik was released from prison.114 When asked by the prosecutor at
Dailey’s trial, Skalnik told the jury that “he had not been promised anything in return
for his testimony.”115 Over the years, Skalnik’s role as a career snitch earned him

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Denzel, supra, note 98.
104. Colloff, supra note 82.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Daniele Selby, This Man’s Lies Sent 4 People to Death Row and Dozens to Prison––Here’s What You
Need to Know, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Dec. 16, 2019), https://innocenceproject.org/jailhouse-informant-nytimes
-paul-skalnik/.
108. Colloff, supra note 82.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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plea deals, probation, and release to work for multiple crimes.116 In just six years,
Skalnik worked as a jailhouse snitch in thirty-seven cases, eighteen of which involved
murder charges.117
Skalnik’s legacy remains intact. On September 23, 2021, the Florida Supreme
Court denied a post-conviction motion for James Dailey, even though Pearcy gave
an affidavit that “he alone had committed the murder” and attorneys produced evidence that Skalnik lied on the stand during the original trial about his criminal history.118 To this day, Dailey remains on death row.119
III. HOW TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF JAILHOUSE SNITCHES
Some readers may be wondering why the problem of jailhouse informants is still
relevant, given that it has already been addressed by the Supreme Court in Brady v.
Maryland.120 There, the Court held that if the finder of fact knows that an informant
has been given a benefit in exchange for testifying, they can factor that into their
determination of credibility and whether to believe the claim over the defendant’s
presumption of innocence. After all, “[d]isclosure of impeachment evidence is constitutionally required under Brady v. Maryland—if it is material.”121 Although what
qualifies as “material” has been a subject of discussion, the Supreme Court elaborated
in Giglio v. United States that “[w]hen the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be
determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility
falls within this [Brady] rule.”122
However, prosecutors continued to defy their Brady and Giglio obligations after
these Supreme Court rulings in pursuit of convictions. One such defiance occurred
in the case of Ellen Reasonover, a woman in Missouri who was convicted in 1983 of
robbing a gas station and killing an attendant.123 The State’s case was weak, as there
was no murder weapon, no fingerprints were found at the scene, no witnesses could
testify to Reasonover’s presence at the gas station, and worst of all, the cash register
showed that no money was stolen.124 According to The Washington Post, “[t]he jury
relied almost entirely on the testimony of two inmates, Rose Jolliff and Mary Ellen
Lyner, both of whom testified that Reasonover confessed to them.”125

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Florida Supreme Court Denies Challenge to Death-Row Prisoner James Dailey’s Conviction, Finds
Evidence of Innocence ‘Immaterial’ or ‘Inadmissible,’ DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2021), https://death
penaltyinfo.org/news/florida-supreme-court-denies-challenge-to-death-row-prisoner-james-daileys-conviction
-finds-evidence-of-innocence-immaterial-or-inadmissible#:~:text=Calling%20his%20evidence%20of%20inn
ocence,murder%20of%20a%20teenage%20girl.
119. Id.
120. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
121. Paul C. Giannelli, Brady and Jailhouse Snitches, 57 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 593, 599 (2007) (discussing how modern prosecutors apply Brady in disclosing information on jailhouse informants).
122. Id. (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972)).
123. Athelia Knight, 1983 Murder Conviction Overturned, WASH. POST (1999), at A-2; see also
INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 35.
124. Knight, supra note 124.
125. Id.
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Prosecutors made deals with the jailhouse informants to reduce their sentences;
however, these deals, along with the informants’ extensive history of breaking the
law, were not disclosed to the jury.126 Because of the admission of the jailhouse
informants’ testimony, Reasonover was sentenced to fifty years without parole.127 In
1999, Reasonover was exonerated after two taped conversations were uncovered.128
The first was a phone call between Reasonover and one of the jailhouse snitches after
the alleged confession took place, in which Reasonover maintained her innocence.129
The second was a recording in prison between Reasonover and her boyfriend where
again, they maintained their innocence of the crime.130 Although the police had possession of these tapes prior to the original trial, and they certainly constituted impeachment evidence under Brady and Giglio, the tapes were not disclosed to the defense.131 Reasonover served seventeen years in prison for a crime she did not commit
based exclusively off of the testimony of the jailhouse snitches and the prosecution’s
failure to disclose required impeachment evidence.132
In 2004, the Supreme Court heard another case on the application of Brady, this
time regarding the use of paid informant testimony at trial.133 There, the testimony
of two informants conveyed that the defendant confessed to “kill[ing a] white boy,”
obtained a gun to commit robberies, and stated that he would “take care of” any trouble.134 The subsequent conviction resulted in a death sentence.135 However, the State
failed to disclose that both witnesses were informants whose testimony was prepared
by the State, that one witness was paid $200 to cooperate, and the other witness was
threatened with life in prison if he did not testify.136 In its decision, the Court quoted
Brady, explaining that under the due process clause of the Federal Constitution’s
Fourteenth Amendment, “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”137 Applying this standard, the Court found that the nondisclosure of the status
and incentives of the informants “qualifi[ed] as evidence advantageous” to the accused and “[was] ‘material’ for Brady purposes.”138 In this way, the Court clarified
that state officials must disclose any benefits to the defense that are given to informants in exchange for their testimony.139
While Banks may imply that defendants have been given adequate protections
against the dangers of jailhouse informant testimony, reality paints a different and far
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
Id. at 668.
Id. at 669.
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Id. at 691.
Id. at 671–72.
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more troubling picture. Even though prosecutors are explicitly and constitutionally
required to disclose material impeachment evidence regarding jailhouse informants,140 they often choose not to do so in practice. In 2020, the Orange County District Attorney’s Office released a report detailing the failure of prosecutors to fulfill
their obligations when using jailhouse informants in court.141 The fifty-seven page
report detailed how prosecutors in the Scott Dekraai mass shooting case used a career
jailhouse snitch, but “failed to disclose to Dekraai’s defense team the full history of
the veteran informant in a timely manner, as required by law.”142 These Brady failures caused the court to extend a plea deal to Dekraai, allowing him to avoid the
otherwise expected death sentence.143 In addition, the report noted that the “prosecutors, sheriff’s deputies and police had for years systemically used jailhouse informants to coax confessions out of inmates who had lawyers. That is a violation of the
federal right-to-counsel law . . . . The investigation concludes the malpractice warrants severe internal discipline . . . .”144 However, these prosecutors were allowed to
step down from their position and form their own private firm and were never pursued
by the state Attorney General.145 Similarly, the Fair Punishment Project published a
report in 2017 on the “Epidemic of Brady violations” across the nation.146 The report
noted that since 2015, New Orleans exonerated thirty-six individuals who were
wrongfully convicted due to prosecutorial misconduct and Brady violations.147 Nine
of these exonerees served time on death row.148 One individual, Cameron Todd
Willingham, was convicted for the death of his children based on faulty arson science
and a jailhouse informant.149 In 2004, Willingham was executed by the state.150 Recently, evidence emerged that the prosecutor in his case gave benefits to the jailhouse
snitch in exchange for testimony.151 This evidence was never disclosed to Willingham’s defense team.152
If prosecutors cannot be trusted to uphold the constitutional rights of defendants,
it is near impossible to believe that they would take the initiative on considering factors other than the quickest route to a conviction. Disclosing evidence of deals made
with jailhouse informants for testimony is a bare constitutional minimum under
140. See id.
141. Tony Saavedra, Prosecutors in Orange County Snitch Scandal Were Intentionally Negligent, DA Probe
Concludes, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (July 20, 2020, 11:59 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2020/07/20/prosecuto
rs-in-orange-county-snitch-scandal-were-intentionally-negligent-da-probe-concludes/.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The report finishes by concluding that prosecutors “obfuscated and failed to accept responsibility
for their lapses, trampled defendant rights and denied the full imposition of justice for victims and families.”
Id. It also noted that five other criminal cases were exposed by the informant scandal. Id.
145. Id.
146. Christopher Zoukis, The Fair Punishment Project Details an “Epidemic of Brady Violations,” HUM.
RTS, DEF. CTR. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2018/jan/19/fair-punishment-projectdetails-epidemic-brady-violations/.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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Brady,153 and the previously discussed cases prove that many prosecutors completely
disregard their affirmative obligation. Considering this, it is not realistic to believe
that prosecutors will take the time to evaluate the reliability of informant testimony
before putting a snitch on the stand. Further, it is just as unlikely that prosecutors
will share details of the circumstances under which the alleged confession occurred
with the defense or choose to only introduce informant testimony that is independently corroborated.
In light of the lack of a constitutional framework in practice that adequately
guards against the introduction of false jailhouse informant testimony, several states
over the past fifteen years have passed legislation to provide additional safeguards.154
One such state is Connecticut, which codified its regulations in Public Act No. 19131 and that went into effect on October 1, 2019.155 In this law, upon a motion of
the defendant, the state must disclose if it intends to use a jailhouse informant at
trial.156 In addition, the state must provide the defendant with “[t]he complete criminal history of any such jailhouse witness,” any promises for benefits that has been
offered or given or that the state “may offer in the future,” information about statements between the informant and the defendant and the informant relaying such information to the state, all information about “any time the jailhouse witness recanted
any testimony subject to the disclosure,” and the history of the inmate’s role as an
informant.157 While outlining these specific disclosures, the law also adds that the
state must provide this information to the defense “not later than forty-five days after
the filing of the motion.”158 Additionally, at the request of the defendant prior to trial,
Connecticut courts must hold a pretrial hearing to “determine whether any jailhouse
witness’s testimony is reliable and admissible.”159 The burden to show that the testimony is reliable and should be admitted falls on the state.160 Factors that the courts
consider in determining reliability are outlined as follows:
(1) The extent to which the jailhouse witness’s testimony is confirmed by
other evidence; (2) The specificity of the testimony; (3) The extent to
which the testimony contains details known only by the perpetrator of the
alleged offense; (4) The extent to which the details of the testimony could
be obtained from a source other than the defendant; and (5) The circumstances under which the jailhouse witness initially provided information
supporting such testimony to a sworn member of a municipal police department, a sworn member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or a prosecutorial
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157.
158.
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160.

See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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official, including whether the jailhouse witness was responding to a leading question.161
Finally, the legislation requires that the State create a records system to track
which cases jailhouse informants testify in and what deals they are given.162 This
information is required to be sent to the “Criminal Justice Policy and Planning Division within the Office of Policy and Management” to be maintained across the
state.163
Another state that has regulated the use of jailhouse informants through legislation is Illinois, which passed Public Act 100-1119 to go into effect on January 1,
2019.164 There, the law requires that the State automatically disclose to the defense
if they plan on calling a jailhouse informant to speak at trial.165 Additionally, the law
requires the disclosure of “[t]he complete criminal history of the informant;” any
promises for benefits that have been offered or given or that the state “will make in
the future;” information about statements which the informant made to the state; all
information about “any time the informant recanted that testimony or statement;” the
history of the inmate’s role as an informant, and “any other information relevant to
the informant’s credibility.”166 While outlining these specific disclosures, the law
adds that the State must provide this information to the defense “at least 30 days prior
to a relevant evidentiary hearing or trial.”167 Illinois also includes a provision for the
automatic hosting of a pretrial hearing “to determine whether the testimony of the
informant is reliable, unless the defendant waives such a hearing.”168 Similar to Connecticut, the burden is on the State to show that the jailhouse informant’s testimony
is reliable at the pretrial hearing.169 However, unlike Connecticut, Illinois does not
provide new factors to consider at the pretrial hearing; rather, it instructs the court to
consider the required disclosures, as well as “any other factors relating to reliability.”170
Although it is currently pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee, Kansas recently proposed House Bill No. 2366 to regulate the admissibility of jailhouse informant testimony at trial.171 This bill is distinct from the Illinois and Connecticut
laws in that its strictest requirements only apply to cases of murder and rape.172 That
said, in any case, the State is required to automatically disclose its plan to use a jailhouse informant at trial to the defense, as well as “[t]he criminal history of the jailhouse witness;” any promises for benefits that has been offered or given or that “will

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. §§ 19-131(2)(a)(1)–(5).
Id. §§ 19-131(3)(a)(1)–(2).
Id. § 19-131(3)(b).
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21 (2019).
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be provided in the future;” information about statements between the informant and
the defendant and the informant relaying such information to the state; all information
“regarding the jailhouse witness recanting testimony or statements;” and the history
of the inmate’s role as an informant.173 Additionally, in cases of murder or rape and
at the request of the defendant, Kansas courts must hold pretrial hearings to “determine whether the jailhouse witness’s testimony exhibits reliability and is admissible.”174 In this determination, the courts consider factors including “[t]he extent to
which the jailhouse witness’s testimony is confirmed by other evidence.”175 As in
the previous cases, the burden is on the state to prove reliability “by a preponderance
of the evidence.”176 Although an identical bill died in committee in May 2020,177
this session’s bill passed the House chamber with bipartisan support and without a
single “nay” vote.178
Rules of the admissibility of jailhouse informant testimony in other states is varying. In November 2020, the Attorney General of New Jersey promulgated a directive that prosecutors cannot introduce a jailhouse informant at trial without the
approval of the County Prosecutor, and notes that this approval can only be given if
“independent, credible evidence corroborating the informant’s testimony” exists.179
This directive also discusses specific disclosures that prosecutors must automatically
give to the defense.180 Current California181 and Texas182 laws also require independent corroboration, and a proposed bill in Washington in 2016 did the same.183
Other states, like Nebraska,184 list specific disclosure requirements and record requirements, but have not codified provisions relating to pretrial hearings. Still other
states, like Indiana,185 have no legislative provisions related to the admissibility of
jailhouse informants.
Further, although this Note focuses on the regulation by states on the admissibility of jailhouse testimony, there is also a need for federal legislative reform. As noted
by the National Registry of Exonerations, jailhouse informants “are much more likely
to testify in federal than in state cases.”186 Unlike state exonerations, which show a
pattern of jailhouse informants being used in more serious cases involving murder
173. Id. (1)(a)(1)(A)–(E).
174. Id. (1)(b)(1).
175. Id. (1)(b)(1)(A).
176. Id. (1)(b)(2).
177. See H.B. NO. 2544, Bill. Hist., KAN. 2019–2020 LEGIS. SESSIONS, http://www.kslegislature.org/li_202
0/b2019_20/measures/hb2544/ (last visited May 22, 2022).
178. See KAN. H.B. NO. 2366, Hist. (last visited May 22, 2022).
179. Directive 2020-11 from Gurbir S. Grewal, N.J. Att’y Gen., to Cnty. Prosecutors (Oct. 9, 2020), https://
www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/ag-Directive-2020-11_Jailhouse-Informants.pdf [hereinafter N.J. Law
Enforcement Directive].
180. Id.
181. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111.5 (West 2019).
182. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.075 (West 2017).
183. H.B. 2654, 62d. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012).
184. NEB. REV. STAT. §29-4704 (2019).
185. Fighting Against In-Custody Witnesses, Flipping Co-Defendants, and Jailhouse Snitches, BANKS &
BROWER LLC (Oct. 3, 2019), https://banksbrower.com/2019/10/03/fighting-against-in-custody-witnesses-flipp
ing-co-defendants-and-jailhouse-snitches/.
186. Gross & Jackson, supra note 26.
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and the death penalty, statistics from federal exonerations suggest a pattern of jailhouse informants also being used in less serious crimes, such as drug prosecutions.187
In 2006, Ann Colomb and her sons were convicted of crack cocaine distribution and
purchasing over fifteen million dollars-worth of cocaine after thirty jailhouse informants testified against them.188 While the family sat in prison with sentences ranging
from a minimum of ten years to a maximum of life imprisonment, the “for-profit
snitching ring” in which informants could pay for information about the federal case
was exposed after an inmate paid over two thousand dollars for the case file, did not
receive it, and wrote a letter to his prosecutor that led to an investigation being called
by the judge.189 However, even with the additional use of jailhouse informants in
less serious crimes, Congress has failed to pass any legislation that governs the admissibility of jailhouse informant testimony in federal courts.
Instead, some federal courts have created a low level of regulation on the use of
jailhouse informants in criminal proceedings by implementing a requirement of jury
instructions “regarding the special unreliability of compensated criminal witnesses.”190 In the standard jury instructions on this issue, juries are told to weigh the
credibility and interest of the informant by weighing the following factors:
(1) [W]hether the witness has received or hopes to receive anything (including pay, immunity from prosecution, leniency in prosecution, personal
advantage, or vindication) in exchange for testimony; (2) the extent to
which the informant’s testimony is corroborated by other evidence; (3) the
extent to which the details of the testimony could be obtained from a
source other than the defendant; (4) any other case in which the informant
testified or offered statements against an individual but was not called, and
whether the statements were admitted in the case, and whether the informant received any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for that
testimony or statement; (5) whether the informant has ever changed his or
her testimony; (6) the criminal history of the informant; and (7) any other
evidence relevant to the informant’s credibility.191
While these factors are thorough and important to consider in determining
whether the informant’s testimony is credible and reliable—especially independent
corroboration as described in the second factor—the jury instructions leave too much
room for error by giving this power of consideration to the jury. Instead, fabricated
testimony by jailhouse informants would be better prevented if the above factors were
considered by the court in a pretrial hearing and unsatisfactory testimony not admitted into trial.

187. Id. (“About 10% of federal exonerations in non-murder cases included jailhouse informant testimony
(8/81), compared to 1% of non-murder exonerations in state courts (9/819)”).
188. Natapoff, supra note 27.
189. Id. U.S. District Judge Tucker Melacon stated, “The problem wasn’t just this case. We potentially
have a huge problem with this network in the federal prison system.” Id.
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The strongest existing state provisions on regulating jailhouse informant testimony relate to (i) robust pretrial hearings where specific enumerated factors are considered by the court prior to admitting the jailhouse informant testimony; and (ii)
required disclosures regarding any benefits that have been or may be provided in
exchange for the testimony. Pretrial hearings are a critical protection in jailhouse
informant legislation because they prevent unreliable testimony from ever entering
the trial. This, in turn, takes the burden off of the defendant to waive his or her
constitutional right to remain silent and defend themselves from the claim in front of
a fact finder. Reforms from Connecticut,192 Washington,193 Illinois,194 and Kansas195
all contain provisions to hold pretrial hearings on the reliability of the informant testimony. Unfortunately, Connecticut196 and Kansas197 place the burden on the defendant to request the pretrial hearing; only Illinois requires its courts to automatically
schedule the hearing when the state announces its intent to call an informant. 198 At
these pretrial hearings, it is imperative that the state hold the burden of showing reliability, rather than the defendant bearing the burden of proving the opposite. Additionally, Illinois199 and Connecticut200 both note that the prosecution must show reliability by a preponderance of the evidence, or it will not be admitted at trial.
Relatedly, the most effective type of pretrial hearing is one in which the court
considers codified factors inclusive of independent corroboration of the informant’s
story. Requiring independent corroboration of the informant’s testimony is crucial
because, without verifying evidence, the testimony is barred from entering the trial.
In effect, this prevents instances where a self-motivated informant’s testimony, either
through fed information or a fabricated story, is the only evidence putting an innocent
person behind bars. Further, this diminishes any incentive or avenue for a prosecutor
to pursue a conviction by suborning perjury from a jailhouse informant. Reforms
from Connecticut,201 Washington,202 and Kansas203 require their courts to consider
independent corroboration in the pretrial hearing. In contrast, because the Attorney
General only has power over prosecutors, the New Jersey directive cannot force the
hand of the courts and therefore, there is no provision for pretrial reliability hearings.204 In Illinois, unlike Connecticut and Kansas, courts are instructed to consider
192. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-131(2) (2019).
193. H.B. 2654(3), 64th Leg., 2016 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016).
194. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21(d) (2019).
195. H.B. 2366(1)(b)(1), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021). However, this bill only applies in criminal
rape or murder cases.
196. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-131(1)(a) (2019).
197. H.B. 2366(1)(b)(1), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
198. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21(d) (2019).
199. Id.
200. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-131(2)(b) (2019).
201. Id. § 19-131(2)(a)(1).
202. H.B. 2654(3)(1)(i), 64th Leg., 2016 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016).
203. H.B. 2366(b)(1)(A), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
204. See N.J. Law Enforcement Directive, supra note 180. Without these hearings to block unreliable testimony from entering trial, this directive provides less protections than the other pieces of legislation discussed.
That said, the New Jersey Law Enforcement Directive has some strength in its ability to condition approval for
prosecutors to use jailhouse informants on the independent corroboration of the informant testimony. Additionally, because prosecutors in New Jersey are not allowed to move forward in cases involving jailhouse
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the required disclosure factors, as well as “any other factors relating to reliability,”
during these hearings.205 However, independent corroboration is not a required factor.206 Although the previously quoted provision serves essentially as a blanket statement, its breadth also gives courts the discretion to not consider important factors,
such as the independent corroboration of the informant’s story.
The second robust protection is codifying specific, mandatory disclosures about
the informant that the state must provide to the defense, including the informant’s
criminal history, past testimony as an informant, and benefits offered in exchange for
testifying. Connecticut,207 Illinois,208 Kansas,209 Nebraska,210 and New Jersey211 all
include provisions on required disclosures in their reforms. Although technically this
information should already be disclosed under Brady,212 history shows a chilling pattern of prosecutors openly circumventing their obligations.213 However, by codifying
specifically which disclosures are required, prosecutors may be less inclined to break
state law and may be more easily held accountable if they do. Nebraska’s statute, for
example, grants discretion to the court to sanction non-complying prosecutors by ordering the disclosure of withheld materials, granting a continuance, denying the admission of undisclosed evidence or witnesses, or acting within a blanket statement to
“[e]nter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.”214 Additionally,
these disclosures aid the defense in establishing that the informant’s story is false on
cross examination or during a pretrial hearing.
One noteworthy provision which is tied to required disclosures and should be
included in any legislative reform is the affirmative obligation to report any benefits
or deals that may be given to the informant “in the future.” Kansas,215 Nebraska,216
New Jersey,217 Connecticut,218 and Illinois219 include this obligation in their respective bills, while Washington proposed its required consideration by the court during
the pretrial hearing.220 This provision is critical to block the loophole in which a
prosecutor could seek to circumvent their responsibilities by implying before trial
that favorable treatment would be given in exchange for incriminating testimony, but
informants without approval from the County Prosecutor, the likelihood that they will engage in misconduct or
knowingly suborn unreliable testimony at trial is lessened.
205. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21(c)(7) (2019). This is a weakness in the Illinois law and could lead to
innocent persons being locked up solely on the testimony of informants that is not corroborated by any other
evidence.
206. See id.
207. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19–131(1)(a)(1–5) (2019).
208. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-2(c)(1–7) (2019).
209. H.B. 2366(1)(a)(1)(A–E), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
210. NEB. REV. STAT. §29-1912(1)(a–e) (2019).
211. N.J. Law Enforcement Directive, supra note 180.
212. Giannelli, supra note 122, at 599 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
213. See, e.g., Saavedra, supra note 142; Zoukis, supra note 147.
214. NEB. REV. STAT. §29-1919(4) (2019).
215. H.B. 2366(1)(a)(1)(B), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
216. NEB. REV. STAT. §29-1912(1)(h) (2014).
217. N.J. Law Enforcement Directive, supra note 180.
218. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-131(1)(a)(2) (2019).
219. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21(c)(2) (2019).
220. H.B. 2654(3)(1)(b), 64th Leg., 2016 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016).
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not providing the favorable treatment until the trial is over. By implying to informants that helpful testimony could result in benefits in the future, prosecutors can take
the position that they did not need to disclose the suggestion of a future benefit, as it
did not constitute a deal or promise. Requiring any future favorable treatment to be
disclosed prior to trial would resolve this issue and provide a potential avenue for
appellate or post-conviction relief in cases in which the prosecution sought to circumvent their obligations.
In addition to future benefits, a necessary precursor to prosecutorial transparency
and full compliance with the required disclosures is maintaining statewide recording
systems that track which cases informants have testified in, what benefits or deals
they were offered, and any benefits given subsequent to the conclusion of trial. Oklahoma,221 New Jersey,222 Nebraska,223 Kansas,224 and Connecticut225 all include reforms to require that the state maintain records of jailhouse informants. Without
these record systems, it is unlikely that even good faith efforts to comply with the
required disclosures would be adequate, as jailhouse informants may obtain agreements with different prosecutors’ offices and testify in various jurisdictions within
the state. While these record systems are necessary, they are not sufficient protections on their own.226
Although each state listed above is certainly more progressive than the rest of
the nation in their codification or possession of any provision limiting the automatic
admission of jailhouse informant testimony, Connecticut and Illinois currently lead
the nation’s reforms. With its provision on pretrial hearings containing required consideration of independent corroboration and list of specific, required disclosures
about the informant that the state must provide to the defense, Connecticut’s 2019
statute is a step above those in other states by its quantity and quality of protections

221. Dale Chappell, Oklahoma Enacts Jailhouse Informant Law, Joins Other States, CRIM. LEGAL NEWS
(July 15, 2020), https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2020/jul/15/oklahoma-enacts-jailhouse-informant-la
w-joins-other-states/.
222. N.J. Law Enforcement Directive, supra note 180.
223. NEB. REV. STAT. §29-1912 (2019).
224. H.B. NO. 2366(2), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
225. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19–131(3)(a) (2019).
226. An additional provision which exists, albeit less commonly, in jailhouse reform legislation is for the
safety of the jailhouse informants themselves. Being labeled a snitch in prison can lead to physical beatings,
shank stabbings, or even death by the hands of another inmate. Mark Abadi, 7 regular people who went to jail
undercover for 2 months learned how dangerous it can be to break the most important rule of life behind bars,
INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.insider.com/60-days-in-undercover-inmates-snitching-in-jail-2019-2. If
identifying information of those who testify is easily found in the public domain, then actual informants who
could provide legitimate information on a case may be too afraid to step forward. While witness protection is
important and should be included, it is not contrary or mutually exclusive to the idea of protecting defendants
against wrongful convictions. In fact, it has been addressed by states such as Connecticut, Kansas, and Nebraska
in their acts of legislative reform. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-131(1)(c) (2019); H.B. 2366(1)(a)(3), 2021 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021); NEB. REV. STAT. §29-1912(4) (2019). For example—although as of April 2022 the
Kansas bill is pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee—the Kansas bill contains the following provision in
connection with the specific disclosures required by the State:
(3) If the court finds that disclosing the information described in paragraph (1) is likely to cause bodily harm to
the jailhouse witness, the court may: (A) Order that such evidence be viewed only by the defense counsel and
not by the defendant or others, or (B) Issue a protective order. H.B. NO. 2366(1)(a)(3), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Kan. 2021).
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offered.227 However, one drawback to the Connecticut statute is that the burden is
placed on the defendant to ask for the listed disclosures and for a pretrial hearing.228
The 2019 Illinois Public Act stands second to Connecticut’s statute for listing
required disclosures, including promises or benefits that “will be made in the future,”229 and automatically requiring courts to hold pretrial hearings on the admission
and reliability of the jailhouse informant’s testimony.230 Although Illinois places the
burden on the state rather than the defendant,231 the lack of consideration factors and
the requirement of independent corroboration places Illinois behind Connecticut on
having the strongest law on the admissibility of jailhouse informant testimony. If the
Illinois statute was amended to list additional factors for the courts to consider during
the pretrial hearings, especially independent corroboration, the law would be
stronger, potentially more so than Connecticut. This is particularly important because Illinois was the state with the highest number of exonerations in 2019.232
Some have suggested that these reforms have not gone far enough. For example,
Professor Russell Covey at Georgia State University has argued that because of the
various incentives and conflict of interests involving jailhouse informants, jailhouse
informants’ testimony will always be inherently unreliable; thus, their use in criminal
prosecutions should be banned altogether.233 There is some merit to Covey’s idea,
as the above-discussed reforms can at best mitigate the problem of unreliability of
jailhouse informants, not cure it entirely. However meritorious his proposal may be,
though, it is very unlikely to come to fruition, at least in the near term. Given that
only a handful of states have passed any lesser regulations on jailhouse informant
testimony,234 it is unrealistic to expect that any state would go so far as an outright
ban. As even Professor Covey recognized, his proposal is “perhaps a radical suggestion.”235
Others have suggested capping the monetary benefits and/or sentence reductions
that jailhouse informants can receive, while still others have proposed a total ban on
such incentives or deals.236 Such proposals could help correct the misalignment of
incentives that underlies the problem of jailhouse informants by minimizing or removing entirely the incentive to come forward with information without regard for
its truth.237 Put otherwise, a jailhouse informant would be less likely to testify falsely
at a criminal trial if the potential benefits of doing so were less significant or
227. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19–131(1–2) (2019).
228. Id. § 19–131(2)(a)).
229. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115–21(c) (2019).
230. Id. 5/115–21(d).
231. Id.
232. Daniele Selby, These 8 States Had the Most Exonerations in 2019, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://innocenceproject.org/these-8-states-had-the-most-exonerations-in-2019/.
233. Covey, supra note 36, at 1429. “[I]t is increasingly clear that nothing less than a total ban can protect
innocent criminal defendants from the substantial risk of wrongful conviction as a result of the use, and abuse,
of jailhouse snitch testimony.” Id. at 1422.
234. Rothfield, supra note 37.
235. Covey, supra note 36, at 1422.
236. Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful Conviction: Theoretical Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REV. 337, 367 (2006).
237. Id. at 368.
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nonexistent. Although such proposals are more moderate than Professor Covey’s,
they would still almost certainly lack political support at this time. Further, unless
paired with robust disclosure requirements and a method for enforcing those requirements, such proposals could have the opposite of their intended effect by motivating
prosecutors to conceal arrangements with jailhouse informants.
Although grand proposals to bar jailhouse informant testimony outright or bar
incentives are unlikely to garner sufficient political support, more limited reforms
that still go beyond those passed across the country may be more realistic. First,
states should expand the scope of independent corroboration to require consideration
of whether corroborating evidence shows that an incriminating statement was in fact
made. Currently, many states do not define independent corroboration in their statutes.238 Instead, snitches are able to testify successfully by providing details matching the crime itself or the crime scene.239 However, this is not an effective measure
of reliability because jailhouse informants can be easily fed information about the
crime by detectives or prosecutors. Additionally, snitches may find information on
their own from newspapers, television programs, or accessing the Internet at prison,
which gives them the necessary material to fabricate a confession by the defendant.240
To prevent this, the corroboration requirement of jailhouse informant legislation
should be expanded to require courts to consider not just whether other evidence corroborates the statement, but also whether corroborating evidence shows that the statement was actually made by the defendant to the jailhouse informant. One of the
critical underlying problems with jailhouse informant testimony is that there are very
few ways to dispute false testimony by a jailhouse informant, and the most common
way forces a criminal defendant to waive his right against self-incrimination.241 Requiring courts to consider whether any evidence corroborates the jailhouse informant’s claim that a defendant made an incriminating statement would help distinguish
between cases where a jailhouse informant fabricated a statement and those where
the incriminating statement was in fact made.
The method of proof of such corroboration need not be restricted. Police and
prosecutors cannot, of course, constitutionally record conversations between wired
jailhouse informants and criminal defendants in the absence of their counsel.242 But
other forms of direct or indirect corroboration could include, for example: (1) testimony of other inmates who heard the conversation; (2) testimony of prison guards
who heard the conversation; (3) prison video footage of the defendant and the jailhouse informant regularly conversing; (4) prison records showing that the jailhouse
informant was housed with the criminal defendant at the time in question and for a
significant time beforehand, such that it is more likely that they shared a genuine,
transparent relationship. Although conclusive evidence that a statement was made
may rarely exist, the absence of such evidence would not be fatal to the admission of

238. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19–131(2)(1) (2019); H.B. 2654(3)(1)(i), 64th Leg., 2016 Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2016); H.B. 2366(1)(b)(1)(A), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
239. Covey, supra note 36, at 1383.
240. Id. at 1380–81.
241. See id. at 1400–03.
242. See generally Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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jailhouse informant testimony; rather, this absence would simply be a factor that
weighs against evidence’s admissibility. This thumb on the scale would be appropriate in light of the inherent unreliability of such testimony and the evidentiary challenges in refuting false testimony.
Second, states should increase the standard of proof placed on the state at the
pretrial hearings to require “clear and convincing evidence” that a jailhouse informant statement is reliable before admitting such testimony. Illinois and Connecticut,
which currently place the burden of proof on the prosecution, impose a “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof.243 However, this only requires the judge to
find that “there is greater than 50% chance that the claim [of the informant] is true”
based off of the prosecution’s evidence.244 Given the inherent unreliability of jailhouse informant testimony, the high risk that such testimony will prejudice the
jury,245 and the extremely high stakes of serious criminal prosecutions for a criminal
defendant, the prosecution’s standard of proof for showing that such testimony is
reliable should be higher the preponderance of the evidence, which is only point one
percent higher than the odds of flipping a coin and it landing on heads. Instead, the
presumption should be that testimony of a jailhouse informant is unreliable and this
presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence, which courts
and commentators sometimes describe as closer to seventy-five percent certainty.246
This higher standard of proof will help limit the jailhouse informant testimony that
makes it to the jury to only that testimony which a court has already found to be
clearly reliable.
Third, to ensure that jurors clearly understand the inherent risks of admitted jailhouse informant testimony, states should codify a provision for jury instructions. If
an informant testifies, the courts should automatically read a jury instruction both
before the informant testifies and again before jury deliberations. In the instruction,
jurors should be informed that jailhouse informants have significant conflicts of interest and should be told which factors to consider in weighing the testimony. For
example, Utah provides the following instruction:
A witness who believes [he/she] may be able to obtain [his/her] own freedom or receive a lighter sentence by giving testimony favorable to the
prosecution, has motive to testify falsely. Therefore, you must examine
that testimony with caution and weigh it with great care. Whether the informer’s testimony has been affected by interest or prejudice against the
defendant is for you to determine.247

243. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115–21(d) (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19–131(2)(b) (2019).
244. Preponderance of the Evidence, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preponderance_
of_the_evidence (last visited May 22, 2022).
245. See generally Neuschatz et al., supra note 88.
246. The State’s Burden of Proof – What is Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, JUST CRIM. L. (Dec. 29, 2016),
https://www.justcriminallaw.com/criminal-charges-questions/2016/12/29/proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt/
(last visited May 22, 2022).
247. SUP. CT. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS–CRIM., JAILHOUSE
INFORMANT (Aug. 7, 2013).
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The Utah instructions then list factors for the jury to consider, including any benefits given in exchange for testifying, the criminal history and past informant testimony, any inconsistent testimony, and “any other evidence related to the informer’s
credibility.”248
Fourth, states should codify a fallback provision by which proof of the prosecution’s failure to disclose all information concerning deals, either explicit or implied,
made with jailhouse informants by the time of trial, or at any time in the future, to
the defendant, results in automatic grounds for a new trial. This aids in solving the
difficulty of enforcing Brady requirements because it incentivizes the prosecution to
disclose all information. Moreover, even though states have passed legislation requiring certain disclosures,249 they have not provided an effective enforcement mechanism, without which the statutes are unlikely to make any significant difference.
Given the national trend of regulating the admission of jailhouse informant testimony in the past fifteen years,250 it is critical for state legislators to understand
which regulatory provisions are the most effective in preventing wrongful convictions. The following reflects the ideal language for jailhouse informant legislation,
using both existing and new provisions, that can be proposed and adopted by state
legislatures. Existing language from other states’ statutes is denoted by quotation
marks.

An Act
Concerning The Admission of Jailhouse Informant Testimony in Criminal Trials.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly convened:
Sec. 1. “The legislature finds that evidence and testimony from accomplices and criminal informants are inherently suspect because a system in
which accomplices and criminal informants are rewarded by the state produces dangerous incentives to manufacture or fabricate evidence. The purpose of this act is to prevent unreliable accomplice and informant testimony from being admitted as evidence in the courts of our state by
informing the court, to the maximum extent possible, of the circumstances
surrounding such evidence and testimony before the court determines its
admissibility.”251 Questions of legislative intent and other provisions
should be interpreted consistently with the purpose of this provision.
Sec. 2. (a) “In a criminal prosecution . . . in which the prosecuting attorney
intends to introduce the testimony of a jailhouse witness,”252 “[t]he court
248.
249.
(2019);
(2019).
250.
251.
252.

Id.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19–131(1)(a)(1–5) (2019); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115–21(c)(1–7)
H.B. 2366(1)(a)(1)(A–E), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021); NEB. REV. STAT. §29–1912(1)(a–e)
See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 35.
H.B. 2654(1), 64th Leg., 2016 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016).
H.B. NO. 2366(1)(b)(1), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
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shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the testimony of the informant is reliable, unless the defendant waives such a hearing. If the prosecution fails to show,”253 by clear and convincing evidence, “that the informant’s testimony is reliable, the court shall not allow the testimony to be
heard at trial.”254 “The court shall make such determination concerning
the reliability of the witness after evaluation of the information or material
disclosed”255 in the following subsections:
(1) “The extent to which the jailhouse witness’s testimony is
confirmed by other evidence,”256 including both independent corroboration of the substance of the statement and that the statement was
in fact made by the defendant to the informant;
(2) “The specificity of the testimony;
(3) The extent to which the testimony contains details known
only by the perpetrator of the alleged offense;
(4) The extent to which the details of the testimony could be obtained from a source other than the defendant; and”257
(5) “[T]he circumstances under which the jailhouse witness provided the information to the prosecuting attorney or a law enforcement officer, including whether the jailhouse witness was responding
to leading questions.”258
(b) “If the prosecuting attorney fails to show by”259 clear and convincing evidence “that a jailhouse witness’s testimony is reliable, the court
shall exclude the testimony at trial.”260
Sec. 3. (a) “In any case under this Section, the prosecution shall disclose
at least 30 days prior to a relevant evidentiary hearing or trial:
(1) [T]he complete criminal history of the informant,”261 “including any pending or dismissed criminal charges;”262

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21(d) (2019).
Id.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-131(2) (2019).
Id. § 19-131(2)(a)(1).
Id. § 19-131(2)(a)(2–4).
H.B. 2366(b)(1)(E), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
Id. 2366(b)(1)(2).
Id.
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21(c)(1) (2019).
H.B. 2366(1)(a)(1)(A), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).

2022]

Journal of Legislation

(2) “[A]ny deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the offering
party has made or will make in the future to the informant,”263 explicit
or implied, or such that has been requested by the informant;
(3) “[T]he statements made by the accused;
(4) [T]he time and place of the statements, the time and place of
their disclosure to law enforcement officials, and the names of all
persons who were present when the statements were made;
(5) [W]hether at any time the informant recanted that testimony
or statement and, if so, the time and place of the recantation, the nature of the recantation, and the names of the persons who were present at the recantation;
(6) [O]ther cases in which the informant testified, provided that
the existence of such testimony can be ascertained through reasonable inquiry and whether the informant received any promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for or subsequent to that testimony or
statement; and
(7) [A]ny other information relevant to the informant’s credibility.”264
(b) “The court may permit the prosecuting attorney to comply with the
provisions of this section after the time period provided in paragraph (1) if
the court finds that the jailhouse witness was not known, or the information
described in paragraph (1) could not be discovered or obtained by the prosecuting attorney exercising due diligence within such time period.”265
(c) “Each prosecuting attorney’s office shall maintain a central record
containing information regarding:
(1) Any case in which testimony by a jailhouse witness is introduced or is intended to be introduced by a prosecuting attorney regarding statements made by a suspect or defendant and the substance
of such testimony; and
(2) [A]ny benefit that has been requested by, provided to, or will
be provided in the future to a jailhouse witness in connection with
testimony provided by such witness.

263. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21(c)(2) (2019) (emphasis added).
264. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21(c)(3-7) (2019).
265. H.B. 2366(1)(a)(2–3), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
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(3) Each prosecuting attorney’s office shall forward the information described in paragraph ([2])”266 to a single designated state
bureau or department, which “shall maintain a statewide database
containing the information forwarded pursuant to this section.”267
(d) “If the court finds that disclosing the information described in paragraph (1) is likely to cause bodily harm to the jailhouse witness, the court
may:
(1) Order that such evidence be viewed only by the defense counsel and not by the defendant or others; or
(2) [I]ssue a protective order.”268
Sec. 4. “If, at any time during the course of the proceedings, it is brought
to the attention of the court that the prosecutor has failed to comply with
Section [IV] of this act, or an order issued pursuant to this section, the court
may:
(a) Order the prosecutor to disclose materials not previously disclosed;
(b) Grant a continuance;
(c) Prohibit the prosecutor from calling a witness not disclosed or introducing in evidence the material not disclosed; or
(d) Enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.”269
Sec. 5. If the testimony of a jailhouse informant is admitted before a jury,
the jury shall be instructed that “[a] witness who believes [he/she] may be
able to obtain [his/her] freedom, or receive a lighter sentence by giving
testimony favorable to the prosecution, has motive to testify falsely. Therefore, you must examine that testimony with caution and weigh it with great
care. Whether the informer’s testimony has been affected by interest or
prejudice against the defendant is for you to determine. In making that determination, you should consider”270 the following factors:

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. H.B. 2366(c)(1–2).
Id.
Id. H.B. 2366(1)(a)(3).
NEB. REV. STAT. §29-1912(6)(1-4) (2019).
SUP. CT. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS–CRIM., JAILHOUSE
INFORMANT (Aug. 7, 2013).
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(a) “[A]ny benefit that has been requested by, provided to, or will be
provided in the future to the jailhouse witness in connection with providing
such testimony.”271
(b) “[O]ther cases, and the number of other cases, in which the informant testified or offered statement against another, whether those statements
are being used, and whether the informer received any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for that testimony or statement, or believed he was likely to receive some benefit for his cooperation;
(c) [W]hether the informant has ever changed his or her testimony;
(d) [T]he criminal history of the informant, not just limited to number
of convictions, but also the level of sophistication gained through the informer’s experience in the criminal justice system; and
(e) [A]ny other evidence related to the informer’s credibility.”272
Sec. 6. If “the defendant shows by newly discovered evidence that an informant’s trial testimony included a false material statement that potentially affected the outcome of the trial;”273 or that the prosecution failed to
disclose all information set forth in Sec. 3 concerning deals made with
jailhouse informants by the time of trial, or at any time in the future, either
explicit or implied, “the court shall order a new trial.”274
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Even knowing the role that jailhouse informants play in wrongful conviction statistics, members of the legal, political, and legislative communities may argue that
additional protections against the admission of their testimony are either unnecessary
or unwarranted. First, because prosecutors are obligated to disclose exculpatory material to defense teams under Brady, there is no need to additionally regulate these
disclosures through state statutes. 275
However, as addressed previously, prosecutors still violate these obligations in
practice and are rarely punished.276 One major issue is that Brady violations are difficult to identify by the defense and require the good faith and honor of the prosecutors. In United States v. Olsen, the Ninth Circuit noted in its dissent that Brady violations are a “systemic problem” and “[s]ome prosecutors don’t care about Brady

271. H.B. 2366(1)(e), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2021).
272. SUP. CT. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS–CRIM., JAILHOUSE
INFORMANT (Aug. 7, 2013).
273. H.B. 2654(4) 64th Leg., 2016 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016).
274. Id. (emphasis added).
275. Giannelli, supra note 122, at 599 (discussing how modern prosecutors apply Brady in disclosing information on jailhouse informants (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
276. Saavedra, supra note 142.
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because courts don’t make them.”277 When courts fail to punish prosecutors who in
fact did not engage in good faith and did not disclose what they needed to, a dangerous precedent or norm is set. The dissent continued, stating that rather than being the
rare exception, “Brady violations have reached epidemic proportions in recent years,
and the federal and state reporters bear testament to this unsettling trend” and noted
that “some prosecutors turn a blind eye to such misconduct because they’re more
interested in gaining a conviction than achieving a just result.”278 Even though disclosures are currently regulated under Brady, we cannot leave the system as is because it has proven itself to be ineffective. In the words of the Ninth Circuit, “[w]e
must send prosecutors a clear message: Betray Brady, give a short shrift to Giglio,
and you will lose your ill-gotten conviction.”279 Codifying required disclosures in
state statutes is the first step to prosecutorial accountability. By detailing exactly
what information needs to be disclosed, statute regulations ensure in theory that all
important materials are handed over to the defense. More importantly, the recommended reforms add a weighty incentive for prosecutors to follow Brady. If any
benefit information is not disclosed as required, the regulations provide mechanisms
for punishment, namely, in throwing out the conviction and automatically granting
the defendant a new trial.
Second, in recent years, some states have created “Conviction Integrity Units” in
their prosecutorial offices, which conduct “extrajudicial fact-based review of secured
convictions to investigate plausible allegations of actual innocence.”280 These units
aim to check the reliability of prior convictions, as well as the methodology used by
their counterparts, and to recommend overturning any incorrect conviction.281 In this
way, opponents could argue that CIUs eradicate the need for further legislative reform, as they would simply recommend overturning any conviction which used a
suspect or seemingly unreliable jailhouse informant. However, although CIUs have
overturned wrongful convictions, there are simply not enough in the country. As
noted by the Equal Justice Initiative, “[o]nly 1.5% of the prosecutor’s offices in the
U.S. have conviction integrity units.”282 Further, in 2015, only half of the nation’s
established CIUs had been involved in any exoneration proceeding.283 State-wide
legislative reform on the admission of jailhouse informant testimony would not only
become effective more quickly, but it would also have the significant benefit of being
proactive, rather than reactive, in preventing wrongful convictions.
Third, reform is unnecessary because the defense can adequately show the unreliability of an informant’s testimony through cross examination.284 In fact, many
277. 737 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2013).
278. Id. at 631–32.
279. Id. at 633.
280. Conviction Integrity Units, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://leg.mt.gov/content/Committees/Interim/2015
-2016/Law-and-Justice/Meetings/Jun-2016/Exhibits/innocence-project-conviction-integrity-doc-june-2016.pd
f (last visited May 22, 2022).
281. Id.
282. Wrongful Convictions, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, https://eji.org/issues/wrongful-convictions/ (last visited May 22, 2022).
283. Exonerations in 2015, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Feb. 3, 2016) http://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2015.pdf.
284. Covey, supra note 36, at 1397–1400.
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would argue that the job of the fact-finder is to determine the “credibility and reliability” of witnesses.285 Even the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. stated that “‘[v]igorous cross examination, presentation
of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.’”286 However,
while this standard may hold for regular witnesses, it does not prove accurate when
applied to jailhouse informant testimony, and therefore should not be the standard.
As noted by the Ohio State Supreme Court, “‘traditional’ methods of testing reliability–like cross-examination–can be ineffective at discrediting unreliable or inaccurate
. . . evidence.”287
Specifically regarding the testimony of jailhouse informants,
“[j]urors are almost certain to give extraordinary weight to evidence that a defendant
has confessed.”288 Simply denying the confession or attempting to poke holes in it
on cross examination has not shown to be necessarily effective with jurors.289
Further, this counterargument presupposes effective defense representation,
which is often not the case. As of 2019, 366 cases of exonerations involved a contributing factor of Inadequate Legal Defense.290 Ineffective assistance of counsel is
especially a concern for low-income individuals who cannot afford private defense
attorneys. Instead, they are typically given public defenders who are often understaffed, overworked, and have minimal investigative resources. In 2017, for example, a group of low-income defendants facing prison time filed a petition for class
certification in a suit against Louisiana officials and the Louisiana Public Defender
office for “structural issues” and failure “to provide effective representation to the
poor.”291 Although the class certification was ultimately denied, the petition brought
forward unfavorable facts about the Louisiana public defender system, including that
many defendants were not afforded “a confidential meeting with their attorney,” others “met their attorneys only in passing,” and none of the attorneys had substantive
conversations about the case with their client, “identified and secured favorable witnesses and evidence, filed appropriate pretrial motions, or provided a voice for their
clients in court.”292 Without effective representation, which cannot be presumed,
cross-examination is not an effective protection against jailhouse informants.
One final argument against additional regulation by state governments is a popular complaint: the price tag. The proposed Kansas bill shares a fiscal note with the
bill that failed in May 2021, which may have been, at least in part, due to its estimated

285. Id. at 1398.
286. Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993)).
287. Id. at 1399 (citing State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 695 (Or. 2012)).
288. Id.
289. Id. In Arizona v. Fulminante, the Court emphasized the near-absolute power of an alleged confession
against all warnings or attacks by stating that “a defendant’s confession is ‘probably the most probative and
damaging evidence that can be admitted against him,’ so damaging that a jury should not be expected to ignore
it even if told to do so.” 499 U.S. 279, 292 (1991) (citing Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987) (White,
J., dissenting)).
290. Rosa Greenbaum, Investigating Innocence: Comprehensive Pre-trial Defense Investigation to Prevent
Wrongful Convictions (2019) (Master of Arts Thesis, University of California, Irvine) (ProQuest).
291. Allen v. Edwards, 322 So. 3d 800, 804 (La. Ct. App. 2021).
292. Id.
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cost: $182,180 per year.293 Of that amount, the Kansas legislature stated that it could
not provide an estimate for the pretrial hearings, but noted that “courts would have
more motions to consider and would make additional rulings, which could increase
the length of cases and increase the time spent by district court judicial personnel in
researching and hearing cases.”294 Similarly, the Kansas Attorney General noted that
the proposed change would lead to increased hours of travel and in attending hearings
on cases, but could not provide an estimate of these costs.295 The Department of
Corrections and League of Kansas Municipalities stated that the proposed bill would
not affect them fiscally.296 Instead, the total costs arose from the Kansas Bureau of
Investigation’s estimation of costs associated with the bill’s provisions on record retention.297 The fiscal note states that “$165,000 would be for concurrent user licensing, $12,410 for training and installation, and $4,770 for maintenance for the first
year. For future fiscal years, the agency estimates on-going expenditures for system
maintenance of $29,520.”298
However, the cost of these legislative reforms varies state-to-state. The state of
Connecticut, for example, passed a nearly identical bill in 2019 with recording and
pretrial provisions,299 and ordered its Office of Fiscal Analysis to conduct a study on
the price tag prior to the legislation being passed.300 There, the office published a
one page report which stated that the bill “does not result in a fiscal impact.”301 For
states which already have modern recording systems, infrastructure, and training in
place, the costs to implement these reforms may be little to none. Certainly, these
costs are significantly less than what a city may face in a civil lawsuit following a
wrongful conviction based in part on unreliable jailhouse informant testimony.302
The comprehensive national price tag on injustices stemming from jailhouse informants, as calculated by the Innocence Project, for “restitution through statutory compensation and civil settlements” totals a whopping $295,598,794.303
More importantly, although these proposed costs for states like Kansas are not
insignificant, they simply cannot compare to the alternative of allowing innocent human beings to waste away in prison for decades for crimes they did not commit.
293. Letter from Adam Proffitt, Dir. of Budget, to Fred Patton, Chairperson on House Comm. on Judiciary,
Kan. Div. of Budget, (Mar. 1, 2020), http://kslegislature.org/li/b2021_22/measures/documents/fisc_note_hb236
6_00_0000.pdf.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-131 (2019).
300. S. 1098 FISCAL NOTE, OFF. OF FISCAL ANALYSIS, 2019 Leg., Gen. Assembly (Conn. 2019).
301. Id.
302. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 35. In a case of arson in 1984, a man named James Kluppelberg
was wrongfully convicted and imprisoned for 25 years in Chicago primarily due to the testimony of a jailhouse
informant who testified that Kluppelberg confessed to him. Id. After the informant admitted to lying on the
stand in exchange for a sentence reduction on his own charges, and a police report in which a woman admitted
to committing the crime was unearthed, Kluppelberg was exonerated and filed a civil suit against the City of
Chicago and its Police Department, which resulted in a nine point three million dollar settlement in 2018. Id.
303. Id. (citing Jeffrey S. Gutman, An Empirical Reexamination of State Statutory Compensation for the
Wrongfully Convicted, 82 MO. L. REV. 369 (2017)).
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These failures are not merely a lack of progressive reform, but a deprivation of constitutional due process rights explicitly mandated by the Fifth Amendment and incorporated to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.304 Criminal defendants further
possess specific protections under Brady to access any exculpatory materials possessed by the state305 and under Giglio to be informed of any promises made to informants testifying for the government.306 Rather than creating new burdens, codifying these required disclosures simply increases state officials’ awareness of their
current responsibilities, establishes an avenue to pursue insubordinate officials who
violated their affirmative legal obligations, and provides a mechanism to grant new
trials to affected defendants. Moreover, although adding pretrial hearings may impose some burden on the state and court resources, the protections are far more effective than the specific disclosures alone. Unlike required disclosures, which are
effectively an unsupervised honor system unless a prosecutor is caught, pretrial hearings put the question of the informant’s reliability in the objective hands of the court,
thereby lessening the risk of prosecutorial misconduct. Considering the risk of
wrongful incarceration, the rights of criminal defendants should be given greater protections than the ambitions of prosecutors, self-interest of informants, and financial
reservations of legislatures.
CONCLUSION
“[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”307
Jailhouse informant testimony is inherently unreliable because the vast majority
of informants are given considerable benefits connected to their freedom in exchange
for testifying against criminal defendants.308 This creates an enormous incentive to
fabricate stories of confessions made inside prison cells, or to repeat information fed
to them by state officials.309 Prosecutors are not an effective measure of protection
against this conflict of interest, as many disregard their Brady obligations in favor of
obtaining easy convictions.310
The problem of wrongful convictions goes beyond politics, and legislative action
is vital to creating proactive rather than reactive solutions. A handful of states have
passed reforms to address the issues inherent to jailhouse informant testimony.311
While these reforms are progress, more is needed to help protect against unreliable
jailhouse informant testimony. Critical provisions to implement at a minimum include: (i) rights to a pretrial hearing in which the state must show reliability by clear

304. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
305. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963).
306. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
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William Blackstone) https://www.cato.org/policing-in-america/chapter-4/blackstones-ratio (last visited May
22, 2022).
308. Natapoff, supra note 27.
309. Gross & Jackson, supra note 26.
310. Saavedra, supra note 142; Zoukis, supra note 147.
311. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 35.
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and convincing evidence, and (ii) required disclosures that encompass benefits given
in the future and are based on a statewide records system. In addition, states should
codify specific jury instructions to be used in the case of an informant testifying and
should be explicit with the jury about their inherent conflicts of interest and unreliability. Finally, states should codify provisions to automatically grant a new trial to
defendants if it is discovered that prosecutors failed to disclose all information concerning deals with jailhouse informants.
Since 1989, jailhouse snitches have been responsible for wrongfully imprisoning
212 innocent individuals,312 and causing at least twenty-five eventual exonerees to
be sentenced to death in the United States.313 It is probable that many more have
been executed and died,314 or remain in prison without hope of ever clearing their
name.
While the popular phrase surrounding informants is that “snitches get stitches”
for coming forward with information, the unknown truth is that many informants
receive significant sentence reductions or benefits for their testimony. I propose a
new phrase that more accurately reflects the reality of our criminal justice system –
“snitches cause stitches” – because the unregulated admission of jailhouse informant
testimony at criminal trials allows the self-interest of snitches and prosecutors to
overcome truth, and to take away the freedom and lives of innocent citizens.

312. See National Registry Detailed View, supra note 22.
313. INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 35.
314. See Zoukis, supra note 147.

